INTRODUCTION
Belarus had seized headlines in the West beating the Covid Pandemic, since July 2020. A rigged presidential election followed by mass protests prompted commentators throughout western Europe and the United States to predict the early exit of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, often called as the “Last Dictator in Europe.” But political support and promises of security assistance from Russia, have helped President Lukashenko hold on to power. Unfortunately instead of a revolution, the situation has become a prolonged standoff.
As the unrest drags on, Western countries need to find a way to promote democratic progress in Belarus without provoking a counterproductive Russian response. A mis-adventure on the part of the United States or other western nations could transform the country into a zone of geopolitical confrontation. Such an outcome would harm Western interests, European security, and the people of Belarus.
To avoid such a scenario, the United States and the European Union must base their policies on a realistic assessment of the rebel protest movement’s vulnerabilities and Moscow’s strengths. They should seek a middle-ground amicable solution that leads to Lukashenko’s departure and also acknowledges Russia’s close ties to Belarus. At the same time, they should gradually normalize relations in order to slowly create better conditions for future democratic progress. Its tricky situation which the Western countries should take stock off. Such a policy would recognize the Belarusian protesters’ anger at the status quo, prevent the country from becoming a zone of great-power contestation, and reduce the risk of a large-scale Russian intervention that would close the path to reform in the trouble torn nation.
BASIC REALITIES BEHIND THE REVOLT
As the protest movement in Belarus gained momentum throughout the month of August, many political analysts predicted that Lukashenko’s days were numbered. Those predictions were premature. As impressive as the demonstrations might be, the rebels lack the strength to force President Lukashenko to step down or agree to new elections. His main opponent, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, has fled to Lithuania. As a political novice (she entered the campaign only after the arrest of her husband, a declared candidate), she serves as a symbol of the protest but lacks the skills to lead it.
Western countries are yet to find a way to promote democratic progress in Belarus.
Tikhanovskaya has wisely acknowledged the limitations of her role and established a Coordination Council, which was initially tasked with facilitating a peaceful transfer of power away from Lukashenko. The government violently reacted immediately, proclaiming the opposition Council illegal and opened criminal cases against its members. Most of its leading members are now under arrest or have fled the country. As a result, the Coordination Council has proved ineffective in the way of leadership. However activists manage to organize the enormous anti-Lukashenko demonstrations in Minsk and other provinces on Sundays, using the social media platform Telegram, and the council does not coordinate their activities. Meanwhile, the council failed to expand the grassroots opposition beyond its original base of mainly young, urban protesters. Council failed to convert support among scores of workers at state-owned factories into a nationwide strike that could weaken a core Lukashenko constituency. Moreover, the council has already scaled down its demands. Instead of calling for Lukashenko to step aside, it now speaks more vaguely about the need to “organize the process of overcoming the political crisis and ensure social cohesion.”
For his part, President Lukashenko is weaker than ever before, but he has still managed to maintain popular support in rural areas and small towns and among older generations of Belarusians. The governing elite, including most of those in the security services, has also remained overwhelmingly loyal. The result is a stalemate with no solution in sight in the immediate future.
RUSSIA MUDDLES BELARUS WATERS
Lukashenko turned his eyes to Russian President Vladimir Putin for political and security assistance when the protests peaked. Russian Premier Putin quickly responded. The Russian leader is of opinion that the “colour revolutions” that have overthrown Kremlin-friendly governments elsewhere in the region, are engineered by Western lobby to weaken Moscow’s sphere of influence. He has made clear that he will do whatever it takes to ensure that Belarus, which Moscow views as a strategic buffer against its Western rivals, remains in Russia’s orbit. To publicize the Russian solidarity with Lukashenko’s government, Putin publicly received Lukashenko in Sochi, approved a $1.5 billion loan to ease Minsk’s debt burden, and announced that he had “set up a certain police reserve” that he could deploy if the situation in Belarus “gets out of control.” He has also made clear in public and in private conversations with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron that Moscow will not tolerate any Western interference in Belarus.
Still, Moscow’s support for Lukashenko is far from unconditional. The Belarusian strongman has been a difficult partner, repeatedly thwarting Russian attempts to tighten economic and political ties. Just before the election, Lukashenko arrested more than 30 Russian mercenaries employed by a private military company, close to the Kremlin on charges of planning a coup, though he quickly released them when he had to seek Russia’s assistance. The Kremlin might not oppose Lukashenko’s eventual departure, given this mixed record—it could even facilitate it—as long as Belarus remains firmly within Russia’s sphere of influence and the transition does not appear to be the result of popular or Western pressure.
THE WESTERN DILEMMA
Given the vulnerability of Belarus’s opposition and Russia’s need to keep the country in its orbit, countries like France, Germany, and the United States will have to walk a political tightrope. They need to pressure the Belarusian government to stop the violence and negotiate a peaceful end to the unrest, but at the same time they must avoid an open conflict with Moscow.
They have to acknowledge the nature of the opposition protests. The Belarusian opposition focus on domestic issues, not geopolitics, and it does not want to become a pawn in anyone’s anti-Russian struggle. Indeed, the protesters understand that Moscow is economically and politically is the kingpin to their country. Belarus heavily depends on Russia – as both a market for goods and a supplier of vital resources, such as energy. Neither the protests nor Western intervention will change that relationship.
Potential Western backers need to respect this dynamics and be cautious to avoid turning the country into a battleground. They can begin by making clear to everyone—including the Belarusian government and the opposition, as well as Moscow—that their absolute priority is to prevent any further violence, no matter how the domestic political situation evolves.
If the West tries to force an aggressive solution, the outcome could be disastrous.
The United States and the European Union should actively seek to facilitate a peaceful solution through patient and cordial, diplomatic engagement with Moscow, because the Kremlin still holds the key to Lukashenko’s fate. They should offer sanctions relief in return for a settlement that puts an end to human rights violations and advances political accountability. Doing so would position the West to play a larger economic role and help create an opening for democratic progress without inflaming Russian fears of a Western power grab.
But while Western countries should avoid stoking conflict, they must also engage Belarus directly, and not imagine that they can do so, merely through Kremlin. When the current crisis broke out, the U.S. Senate was in the process of confirming a new ambassador to Belarus. Some senators now argue that filling the position under the current conditions would legitimize Lukashenko’s crackdown. Leaving the post empty, however, sends a far worse signal to Belarusian society—that the United States is interested in discussing the country’s issues only with Moscow. Washington should confirm an Ambassador to Belarus as soon as possible, and the new appointee should balance official government engagement with active outreach to the opposition.
CONCLUSION
A post-Lukashenko Belarus, with close ties to Moscow but an improved relationship with the West, remains a possible medium-term outcome of the current crisis. It might not be the best option the West had hoped for, but it is still a good alternative and perhaps the best option in the current scenario. Well-crafted policy could make it a reality. If the West tries to force an aggressive solution, however, the outcome could be disastrous, most of all, for the people of Belarus.
JAI HIND