As Afghanistan crumbles to the Taliban – an examination of umbilical support to given by Pakistan to Taliban

The Taliban blitz through Afghanistan, that saw the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces crumble in province after province, and took the militant group to the gates of Kabul and eventual victory in days instead of the weeks or months that the CIA had predicted. As President Ghani fled Afghanistan on 15 August, there has been a wide spread fear and exodus of people from Afghanistan. Mercifully not much bloodshed has taken place and the Taliban have declared a general amnesty for all government officials and urged them to return to work, two days after taking power following a lightning sweep through the country. Contours of the new government are yet to emerge. Pakistan’s longstanding relationship with the Taliban The Taliban victory could not have come without active assistance from Pakistan. Pakistan has had a long association with the Taliban, from birthing it in 1994, supporting its first takeover of Afghanistan in 1996, to sheltering the fighters and leaders in the aftermath of the post-9/11 US invasion, even as it claimed to be supporting the US in the “war on terror”. Through these years, the Pakistan security establishment pushed for talks with the Taliban. How Pakistan helped takeover One reason for the Taliban’s swift advance is the ease with which they overpowered the Afghan security forces, its leadership demoralised by the unseemly haste of the US troops withdrawal. But Afghan’s deposed Vice President Amrullah Saleh and other members of the Ashraf Ghani government also alleged the Pakistan Army’s Special Forces and the ISI were guiding the Taliban. Pakistan’s undeniable contribution has been in providing the Taliban shelter on its territory even as the world expected it to put pressure on the Taliban to arrive at a negotiated political power sharing deal with Ghani’s government. The safe havens had existed from virtually the start of the US “war on terror” in 2001. The US was aware of this, but because its need for Pakistan as a logistics back end for the war in Afghanistan was greater, it did not push the Pakistan military sufficiently to act against these safe havens. While the political leadership of the Taliban camped in the Balochistan capital of Quetta, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in general, and South and North Waziristan became the revolving door for fighters of Afghan Taliban, and its associated group the Haqqani Network, who crossed in and out of Afghanistan at will. In the recent fighting that took Taliban all the way to Kabul, the same safe havens in Pakistan were used to launch their attacks in Afghanistan. Taliban as proxy Over the last three decades, Pakistan has viewed the Taliban as serving a two-fold purpose: first, a Taliban regime in Kabul and its umbilical connection with Pakistan would ensure the Pakistan military a free pass over Afghanistan, territory that it has coveted for “strategic depth” in its enmity with India, while ensuring Pakistan agency over Afghan routes into Central Asia/ Pak’s current concerns While there is smug satisfaction in Pakistan right now at the proxy victory in Afghanistan, many are also warning of “blowback”. All said and done, Pakistan views itself as a modern Islamic state, and although its generals and political leaders may welcome the second coming of Taliban in Afghanistan, significant sections, including in the military, are quite clear that their own country must be shielded from the impact. An immediate fallout would be an influx of refugees, which would be a drain on Pakistan’s slender resources. What is of more concern is that the Taliban’s rise in Afghanistan may fan the fires of extremism in Pakistan, where an array of jihadist groups — anti-India, sectarian, pro-al-Qaeda, anti-Pakistan —continue to exist despite several purported crackdowns against them. The Afghan Taliban victory could embolden the TTP, can possibly give rise to attacks inside Pakistan. Although the Afghan Taliban may be beholden to Pakistan for all the help rendered over the years, there is concern in the Pakistan Army that some sections of the Taliban may be difficult to bring to heel. The Indian security establishment believes that the ISIS-Khorasan has been populated by the Pakistani security establishment with Lashkar-e-Toiba fighters, as a hedge against Taliban. What next for India It is fairly certain that while India will lose influence in Afghanistan, the India-Pakistan relationship will acquire one more layer of difficulty due to the Taliban comeback. The Haqqani Network, closely allied to both the ISI and the Taliban, is blamed by the US and India for the deadly attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul that claimed the lives of an Indian diplomat and an Indian Army officer posted at the embassy, along with 60 Afghan civilians. The Indian security establishment fears that to escape the Financial Action Task Force lens on Pakistan, India-focused jihadi tanzeem such as LeT and JeM may find new safe havens in Afghanistan from where they will continue to plan attacks against India.