Background
Ninth round of US – Taliban talks were held in Doha in August 2019. These talks detailed the process of thinning out of the US troops from Afghanistan and in return the Talibans had assured the US that they would not carry out any attacks on US forces. The next phase of talks were to include the Afghan government. The talks were to be preceded with the release of Taliban prisoners by the Afghan government. This process was delayed due to increased Talibani violence against the Afghan government including two attempts on the life of Afghan Vice President Mr Amarulah Saleh.
What has happened since the February agreement leading to the talks?
The talks were to begin on March 10. But the Afghan government, which was excluded from negotiations between the US and the Taliban, held back on the commitment made by US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad about release 5,000 Taliban prisoners, especially as there was no “reduction of violence” as promised by the Taliban.
But under US pressure, President Ashraf Ghani started freeing prisoners in batches. The Taliban released 1,000 government-side prisoners including soldiers. Over the last few days, a tussle over the release of the last few Taliban prisoners held up the talks by a few more days.
Afghan talks: What will the discussions be on?
There are two main points on agenda for discussion.
- The first is a permanent and comprehensive cease fire. The participants of intra-Afghan negotiations will discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire, including joint implementation mechanisms.
- The second is an agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan. The immediate question is which should come first. The Afghan government has said it wants a ceasefire first.
It is doubtful the Taliban would agree to a truce first before getting what they want out of a political settlement. While in talks with the US, the Taliban continued violent attacks, leveraging these to underline their demands.
What the Taliban want out of a political settlement is unclear. In the past, they have denounced democracy as a western imposition on their vision of Afghanistan. They have dropped several hints of a return to the Taliban-run Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan of 1996-2001. But they have signaled they may accept some of the democratic gains Afghanistan has made in the last two decades. The expectation is that the two sides should agree on an “inclusive” interim government that will be entrusted with hammering out the way forward. While the US would like it done and dusted before President Donald Trump’s re-election bid in November, Ghani, who won a second term this year, would prefer to stretch it out until the US elections, hoping to get from a possible Biden White House the support that has not been forthcoming from Trump.
Who are representing the two sides?
Both sides have 21 persons each in their negotiating teams. The Taliban’s lead negotiator is Sheikh Abdul Hakim, a scholar-cleric from the non-military side who was the “chief justice” of the Taliban judicial system, and is seen as more acceptable to all factions within the Taliban, as well as to Pakistan. His unifying role in the talks will be crucial. The dynamics between Pakistan and some of the key Taliban members are also important. The Pakistan Army and ISI played key roles in facilitating the US-Taliban agreement.
Mullah Baradar, who was released from ISI captivity under pressure from the US in 2018 to take part in the talks with Khalilzad, and is a signatory to the US-Taliban agreement, does not find mention in the list, though he is expected to play a role. Abbas Stanekzai, a hardliner close to the Pakistani security establishment, was earlier projected as lead negotiator but has been pushed to number 2.
The Haqaani Network (HN) is represented by Anas Haqqani. Brother of HN leader Sirajuddin Haqqani, he and two other militants were released from prison in November 2019 in exchange for an American and an Australian hostages.
The government delegation is headed by Masoom Stanekzai, a former intelligence chief, but not all delegates are from the government. Four are women. They will be important to the process of safeguarding women’s rights, hard won over the last two decades. Civil society is represented. Overall, the team’s composition reflects the power play among various interests. Some owe allegiance to Ghani’s rival Abdullah Abdullah, the head of the High Council for National Reconciliation. The pro-Pakistan Hizb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is also represented through his son-in-law, Senator Ghairat Baheer.
What is India’s stake in all this?
New Delhi has not been involved in the process since it began two years ago, and while it has backed the Afghan government for an “Afghan owned and Afghan led peace process”, it has been marginal to even regional discussions. Partly, this is due to India’s diffidence about engaging in a process in which it sees Pakistan playing to install the Taliban as its proxy in Kabul, as the Taliban have links with terrorist groups that target India and Indian interests in Afghanistan. However, this time the Indian Foreign minister joined the inaugural session ‘on line’ and a senior official of the government is attending the talks. While India sees itself on shared ground with Iran on these concerns, Tehran had opened contacts with the Taliban.
India’s other big worry is that the vacuum created by the exit of the US may be filled by China. Wary of the Taliban’s links with Uighur radicals in the Afghan-bordering Xinjiang Autonomous Region, India is concerned that Beijing may use its proximity to Pakistan to insulate this vulnerable territory from these links. It has also begun building ties with the Taliban.
The other concern is the interest in Pakistan to extend the China Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan. Pakistan’s stepped up role in Afghanistan will not only indirectly contribute to China’s influence but also potentially improve the negotiation positions of both Islamabad and Beijing vis-à-vis Washington.
At this moment in India-China relations, the possibility of an enhanced Chinese presence in Afghanistan, in combination with Pakistan and the Taliban, is worrying Afghan watchers in India.